[1]周永圣,崔佳丽,刘馨蕊,等.基于应收账款融资的供应链企业违约问题研究[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2019,(04):353-360+408.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2019.04.05]
　ZHOU Yongsheng,CUI Jiali,LIU Xinrui,et al.The Research on the Default Problem of Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Accounts Receivable Financing[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University:Natural Science Edition,2019,(04):353-360+408.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2019.04.05]
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基于应收账款融资的供应链企业违约问题研究()
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《江西师范大学学报》（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2019年04期
页码:
353-360+408
栏目:
博弈论及其应用
出版日期:
2019-08-10

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Research on the Default Problem of Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Accounts Receivable Financing
文章编号:
1000-5862(2019)04-0353-08
作者:
周永圣1; 崔佳丽1; 刘馨蕊2; 杨晓林1
1.北京工商大学商学院,北京 100048; 2.中国国际金融股份有限公司,北京 100020
Author(s):
ZHOU Yongsheng1; CUI Jiali1; LIU Xinrui2; YANG Xiaolin1
1.Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China; 2.China International Capital Corporation Limited,Beijing 100020,China
关键词:
应收账款融资;  供应链金融;  违约问题;  博弈分析
Keywords:
accounts receivable financing;  supply chain finance;  default problem;  game analysis
分类号:
F 275.1
DOI:
10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2019.04.05
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
在供应链金融应收账款融资模式下,建立了核心企业和中小企业违约问题的进化博弈模型,分析2方参与主体的进化稳定策略,旨在提高银行、核心企业和中小企业的共同效益.研究表明:核心企业和中小企业采用(守约,守约)策略的概率与企业的良好信誉带来的外部收益、对企业的违约惩罚、在供应链中企业长期合作稳定给供应链企业带来的额外收益成正比,与银行的贷款利率、应收账款总额、应收账款抵押率成反比.结合算例分析验证所得结论,为银行和供应链企业提供相关建议.
Abstract:
An evolutionary game model for the core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises default problem in the supply chain finance accounts receivable financing mode is set up,the evolutionary stable strategy of two parties involved in the subject is analyzed,aimed at improving bank,core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises mutual benefits.The study shows that the probability that core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises adopt(honesty,honesty)strategy is positively correlated with the external income brought by good business reputation,the enterprise's default penalties,additional benefits of supply chain enterprises brought by long-term cooperation in the supply chain.The probability that core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises adopt(honesty,honesty)strategy is negatively correlated with bank's lending rate,the total amount of receivable accounts,the receivable mortgage rate.The proposed conclusions are verified through a case study,and the relevant recommendations are provided for the banks and supply chain enterprises.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-11-25
基金项目:首都流通业研究基地(19005857031)和北京市“高精尖学科建设(市级)-工商管理”(19005902053)资助项目.
作者简介:周永圣(1978-),男,江苏南通人,副教授,博士,主要从事物流与供应链管理研究.E-mail:zhouys@amss.ac.cn
更新日期/Last Update: 2019-08-10