[1]舒斯亮.公平关切下考虑企业社会责任的2个零售商竞争研究[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2019,(04):361-367.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2019.04.06]
　SHU Siliang.The Competition of Two Retailers with Corporate Social Responsibility under Fairness Concerns[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University:Natural Science Edition,2019,(04):361-367.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2019.04.06]
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公平关切下考虑企业社会责任的2个零售商竞争研究()
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《江西师范大学学报》（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2019年04期
页码:
361-367
栏目:
博弈论及其应用
出版日期:
2019-08-10

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Competition of Two Retailers with Corporate Social Responsibility under Fairness Concerns
文章编号:
1000-5862(2019)04-0361-07
作者:
舒斯亮
江西科技师范大学商学院,江西 南昌 330038
Author(s):
SHU Siliang
School of Business,Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University,Nanchang Jiangxi 330038,China
关键词:
公平关切;  企业社会责任;  2个零售商;  竞争
Keywords:
fairness concerns;  corporate social responsibility;  two retailers;  competition
分类号:
F 224.32; F 272.5
DOI:
10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2019.04.06
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为了探明公平关切下零售商履行社会责任对其竞争所产生的影响,构建了2种不同公平关切情形下履行社会责任零售商与不履行社会责任零售商之间的竞争模型,并运用博弈方法对其竞争问题进行探讨,同时比较分析了2种不同公平关切情形,得到如下主要结论:零售商公平关切程度的增加将促使竞争中的2个零售商降低产品销售价格; 且对于选择履行社会责任的零售商而言,自身公平关切程度的增加会带来其社会责任水平的上升,其竞争对手公平关切程度的增加则会带来其社会责任水平的下降; 从2个零售商的竞争来看,不管是选择履行社会责任的零售商还是选择不履行社会责任的零售商,相比竞争对手公平关切情形,自身公平关切情形对其竞争更有利,而零售商履行社会责任成本的增加则对选择不履行社会责任的零售商竞争更有利.
Abstract:
In order to find out the influence of the social responsibility to the retailer competition under the fairness concerns,competition model of two retailers under two cases of different fairness concerns is constructed,where one of two retailers has social responsibility and the other has no social responsibility.And using the game theory to discuss the competition of two retailers,and at the same time,making the comparative analysis of the two cases,the results show that with the fairness concerns of retailer increasing,the product price of two retailers will drop,and for the retailer with social responsibility,the level of social responsibility will rise when the behavior of fairness concerns for itself increases,the level of social responsibility will drop when the behavior of fairness concerns for competitor increases.From the view of two retailers' competition,whether the retailer with social responsibility or the retailer with no social responsibility,comparing with the case of competitor fairness concerns,the case of fairness concerns for itself is more favorable to competition,while with the social responsibility cost increasing,the competition of the retailer with no social responsibility is more favorable.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-09-27
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71261006),江西省教育厅科学技术研究(GJJ180611)和江西科技师范大学博士科研启动基金资助项目.
作者简介:舒斯亮(1981-),男,江西南昌人,副教授,博士,主要从事运营与供应链管理研究.E-mail:shusiliang0904@126.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2019-08-10