[1]李建荣.有同事效应的多对一匹配博弈的核[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,(01):15-19.
　LI Jianrong.The Core of Many-to-One Matching Games with Peer Effect[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University:Natural Science Edition,2017,(01):15-19.
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有同事效应的多对一匹配博弈的核()
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《江西师范大学学报》（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2017年01期
页码:
15-19
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-01-01

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Core of Many-to-One Matching Games with Peer Effect
作者:
李建荣
华南师范大学数学科学学院,广东 广州 510631
Author(s):
LI Jianrong
School of Mathematics,South China Normal University,Guangzhou Guangdong 510631,China
关键词:
匹配博弈;  核;  群替代性;  共同性
Keywords:
matching games;  core;  group substitutability;  togetherness
分类号:
O 225; F 224.32
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
有同事效应的多对一匹配博弈的核不一定存在.在群替代偏好下,用联盟分割的方法证明了核匹配一定存在.对偏好的假设源自于某些现实问题的考虑,因此,所得结论具有一定的现实意义.
Abstract:
It is well-known that the core of a many-to-one matching game with peer effect might be empty.Under group substitutable preferences,it is proved that the core is nonempty by coalition structure method.All the assumptions that is apposed on the preference lists come from some real-life observations and considerations,so the results have realistic meaning.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-10-20基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71301056)资助项目.作者简介:李建荣(1974-),女,河南南阳人,副教授,博士,主要从事博弈理论及其应用的研究.E-mail:jrli77@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01