[1]魏光兴,陈永恒.考虑异质性的锦标竞赛机制设计[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2022,(01):18-24.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2022.01.04]
　WEI Guangxing,CHEN Yongheng.The Mechanism Design of Tournament Incorporating Heterogeneity[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University:Natural Science Edition,2022,(01):18-24.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2022.01.04]
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考虑异质性的锦标竞赛机制设计()
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《江西师范大学学报》（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2022年01期
页码:
18-24
栏目:
数学与应用数学
出版日期:
2022-01-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Mechanism Design of Tournament Incorporating Heterogeneity
文章编号:
1000-5862(2022)01-0018-07
作者:
魏光兴; 陈永恒
重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
Author(s):
WEI Guangxing; CHEN Yongheng
School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
关键词:
锦标竞赛;  机制设计;  异质性;  委托代理;  博弈论
Keywords:
tournament;  mechanism design;  heterogeneity;  principal-agent;  game theory
分类号:
O 225; F 123.9
DOI:
10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2022.01.04
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
异质性在锦标竞赛中普遍存在,但是学术界研究较少.对于异质性问题,该文分析参赛者之间的博弈关系、参赛者(代理人)与竞赛组织者(委托人)之间的委托代理关系,建立优化模型,设计最优机制,求解最优努力和最优收益,研究异质性如何影响锦标竞赛的机制参数、努力水平和收益高低.研究发现:(i)异质性会改变锦标机制,源于参赛者变弱的异质性会减小机制参数值,而源于参赛者变强的异质性会先减小再增大机制参数值;(ii)异质性会减弱锦标竞赛的竞争性,因为无论能力高低异质性都会同时降低所有参赛者的努力程度;(iii)异质性使低能力参赛者只能获得保留收益,而高能力参赛者可以获得高于保留水平的超额收益,但是过大的异质性反而会减少其超额收益;(iv)源于参赛者变弱的异质性会降低委托人收益,而源于参赛者变强的异质性只有在其变得足够强时才会提高委托人收益.
Abstract:
Although heterogeneity is popular in tournament,it receives few academic attentions.The game relationship between contestants,the principal-agent relationship between contestants called the agents and tournament organizer as the principal are analyzed.The optimization model is developed to design the optimal mechanism,attain the optimal efforts and the optimal revenues.The effects of heterogeneity on the optimal mechanism,efforts and revenues are investigated,respectively.The findings can be concluded as follows.Firstly,the heterogeneity will change the tournament mechanism.The heterogeneity resulting from weaker contestants will reduce the mechanism parameters monotonously,while that from stronger contestants will decrease and then increase the parameters.Secondly,the heterogeneity will reduce competition level of tournament because all the contestants,no matter strong or weak,make less effort.Thirdly,in case of the heterogeneity, the contestant with low ability can only gain the reserved revenues,but the contestant with high ability can obtain extra revenues that will decrease when heterogeneity becomes too large.Finally,the heterogeneity resulting from weaker contestants will decrease the principal's profits,while that from stronger contestants can increase the principal's profits only when contestants becoming strong enough.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2021-06-10
基金项目:重庆市人文社科课题(20SKGH084)资助项目.
通信作者:魏光兴(1977—),男,重庆万州人,教授,博士,博士生导师,主要从事博弈论与机制设计、物流与供应链管理研究.E-mail:wgx777@126.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2022-01-25