[1]舒斯亮,许琴琴.公平关切信息不对称下双渠道供应链决策与激励合同设计[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2022,(04):349-356.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2022.04.04]
　SHU Siliang,XU Qinqin.The Decision and Incentive Contract Designing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Information Asymmetry of Fairness Concerns[J].Journal of Jiangxi Normal University:Natural Science Edition,2022,(04):349-356.[doi:10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2022.04.04]
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公平关切信息不对称下双渠道供应链决策与激励合同设计()
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《江西师范大学学报》（自然科学版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2022年04期
页码:
349-356
栏目:
数学与应用数学
出版日期:
2022-07-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Decision and Incentive Contract Designing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Information Asymmetry of Fairness Concerns
文章编号:
1000-5862(2022)04-0349-08
作者:
舒斯亮; 许琴琴
江西科技师范大学商学院,江西 南昌 330038
Author(s):
SHU Siliang; XU Qinqin
School of Business,Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University,Nanchang Jiangxi 330038,China
关键词:
公平关切;  信息不对称;  双渠道供应链;  决策;  激励合同
Keywords:
fairness concerns;  information asymmetry;  dual-channel supply chain;  decision;  incentive contract
分类号:
F 272.3
DOI:
10.16357/j.cnki.issn1000-5862.2022.04.04
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
基于实体零售商公平关切行为,分析信息对称与信息不对称下双渠道供应链决策问题,并探讨如何设计激励合同促使实体零售商传递真实的公平关切信息.研究发现:信息不对称下实体零售商传递不真实公平关切信息对双渠道供应链决策会产生影响,且与信息对称情形相比,信息不对称下制造商利润会减少,而实体零售商效用在传递公平关切值高于真实值时会增加; 制造商设计的激励合同能促使实体零售商传递真实的公平关切信息,但合同能否达成受实体零售商真实公平关切值、消费者对渠道价格差异敏感性等因素的影响.
Abstract:
Based on fairness concerns of the physical retailer,the decision of dual-channel supply chain under the situation of information symmetry and information asymmetry is analyzed,and it is discussed how to design the incentive contract to promote the physical retailer to deliver the real information of fairness concerns.The results show that when the physical retailer gives false information about fairness concerns,the decision of dual-channel supply chain will be affected,and compared with the situation of information symmetry,the manufacturer's profit will decrease,the utility of the physical retailer will increase when the fairness concerns value transmitted is higher than the real value.The incentive contract designed by the manufacturer can enable the physical retailer to deliver the real information of fairness concerns,however,whether the contract can be reached is affected by the real value of fairness concerns,the sensitivity of consumer to channel price difference,and so on.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2021-11-25
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71961010)和江西省教育厅科学技术研究(GJJ180611)资助项目.
作者简介:舒斯亮(1981—),男,江西南昌人,副教授,博士,主要从事运营与供应链管理研究.E-mail:shusiliang0904@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 2022-07-25