[1]曾剑锋,柳 键.主导模式与风险厌恶对绿色供应链决策的影响研究[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,(02):204-211.
 ZENG Jianfeng,LIU Jian.The Effect of Dominant Mode and Risk Aversion on Green Supply Chain Decision[J].,2017,(02):204-211.
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主导模式与风险厌恶对绿色供应链决策的影响研究()
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《江西师范大学学报》(自然科学版)[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
期数:
2017年02期
页码:
204-211
栏目:
出版日期:
2017-03-01

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Effect of Dominant Mode and Risk Aversion on Green Supply Chain Decision
作者:
曾剑锋柳 键
1.江西师范大学学报杂志社,江西 南昌 330022; 2.江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西 南昌 330032
Author(s):
ZENG JianfengLIU Jian
1.Journal of Periodical Office,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang Jiangxi 330022,China; 2.School of Information Management,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang Jiangxi 330032,China
关键词:
绿色供应链 风险厌恶 主导模式 Stackelberg博弈
Keywords:
green supply chain risk aversion dominant mode Stackelberg game
分类号:
F 224.32
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
利用主从博弈方法研究由一个制造商和一个风险厌恶零售商构成的绿色供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,通过数理方法分析零售商的风险厌恶程度和主导模式对绿色供应链决策的影响,研究结果表明:随着零售商的风险厌恶程度增大,制造商趋向于产品绿色度水平和产品批发价格的提高,而零售商则趋向于产品销售价格的降低,同时,制造商的利润和绿色供应链系统的效益均增大,而零售商的效用却减小; 对于消费者、零售商以及具有低风险厌恶零售商的供应链而言,零售商主导的供应链模式优于制造商主导的供应链模式,而对于制造商和具有高风险厌恶零售商的供应链,制造商主导的供应链模式优于零售商主导的供应链模式.
Abstract:
The green supply chain with one manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer is studied by the lead-follow game and the Stackelberg game model is established.By the mathematical methods,the effects of retailer’s risk aversion and dominant mode on decision-making policies of green supply chain are analyzed.The results show that with the increasing of risk aversion,the manufacturer tends to advance green degree level and wholesale price of the product,but the retailer tends to reduce sale price of the green product,simultaneously,the profits of the manufacturer and the benefit of the supply chain system both are increase,while the utility of the retailer decrease; the retailer-dominated supply chain is better for the consumers,the retailer and the supply chain with low-risk-averse retailer than the manufacturer-dominated supply chain,on the contrary,the manufacturer-dominated supply chain is better for the manufacturer and the supply chain with high-risk-averse retailer than the retailer-dominated supply chain.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-10-25基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71261006,71461009)和江西省自然科学基金(20151BAB207061)资助项目.作者简介:曾剑锋(1977-),男,江西南康人,讲师,博士,主要从事运营与供应链管理、博弈论等方面的研究.E-mail:jf_zeng@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01